A Humean Constructivist Reading of J. S. Mill's Utilitarian Theory. Issue 2 (7th August 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: DRAKE, NICHOLAS
• Is Part Of: Utilitas. Volume 28:Issue 2(2016)
• Page Start: 189
• Page End: 214
• Publication Date: 2015-08-07
• Subjects: Utilitarianism -- Periodicals; 171.5
• DOI: 10.1017/S0953820815000370
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0953-8208

Abstract

Abstract : There is a common view that the utilitarian theory of John Stuart Mill is morally realist and involves a strong kind of practical obligation. This article argues for two negative theses and a positive thesis. The negative theses are that Mill is not a moral realist and that he does not believe in certain kinds of obligations, those involving external reasons and those I call robust obligations, obligations with a particular, strong kind of practical authority. The positive thesis is that Mill's metaethical position can be interpreted as a Humean constructivist view, a metaethical view that is constructivist about value and entails the existence of practical reasons, but not external reasons or robust obligations. I argue that a Humean constructivist reading of Mill's theory is reasonable, and strengthens Mill's argument from desire for the value of happiness, an important but notoriously weak aspect of his theory.