Paternalism: An Analysis. Issue 2 (20th July 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: RYAN, SHANE
• Is Part Of: Utilitas. Volume 28:Issue 2(2016)
• Page Start: 123
• Page End: 135
• Publication Date: 2015-07-20
• Subjects: Utilitarianism -- Periodicals; 171.5
• DOI: 10.1017/S0953820815000254
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0953-8208

Abstract

Abstract : In this article I argue for a particular analysis of paternalism. I start by examining Dworkin's conditions for the paternalist act and make a case for alternative conditions. I argue that the paternalist actor acts irrespective of what she believes the wishes of the target of her action are and the paternalist actor acts because she has a positive epistemic standing that the act may or will improve the welfare of the target of her action. I also argue that it is consistent with my analysis that there are paternalist acts that don't interfere with the autonomy of the object of the paternalist act. I describe some such acts and make the case that such acts, when they are paternalist acts, may be morally permissible and outline the factors that bear on their permissibility. Finally I locate my analysis in the literature by comparing it to a number of other accounts.