Affect, Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation*. Issue 1 (2nd January 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Steinberg, Justin
• Is Part Of: British journal for the history of philosophy. Volume 24:Issue 1(2016)
• Page Start: 67
• Page End: 87
• Publication Date: 2016-01-02
• Subjects: Spinoza -- affects -- moral motivation -- cognitivism -- desire -- moral judgement -- emotions; Philosophy -- History -- Periodicals; 109
• DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2015.1087837
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0960-8788

Abstract

Abstract : Two priority problems frustrate our understanding of Spinoza on desire [ cupiditas ]. The first problem concerns the relationship between desire and the other two primary affects, joy [ laetitia ] and sadness [ tristitia ]. Desire seems to be the oddball of this troika, not only because, contrary to the very definition of an affect (3d3; 3 General Definition of the Affects), desires do not themselves consist in changes in one's power of acting, but also because desire seems at once more and less basic than joy and sadness. The second problem concerns the priority of desires and evaluative judgements. While 3p9s and 3p39s suggest that evaluative judgements are (necessarily) posterior to desires, Andrew Youpa has recently argued that passages in Ethics 4 indicate that rational evaluative judgements can give rise to, rather than arise out of, desires. I aim to offer solutions to these problems that reveal the elegance and coherence of Spinoza's account of motivation. Ultimately, I argue that whereas emotions and desires stand in a non-reductive, symmetrical relationship to one another, evaluative judgements must be understood as asymmetrically dependent on, and reducible to, emotions or desires. This interpretation sheds light on our understanding of Spinoza's cognitivist account of emotion. For Spinoza, while emotions are representational, they are not underpinned by evaluative judgements. Rather than inflating emotions to include evaluative judgements, he deflates evaluative judgements, treating them as emotions, or valenced representations, and nothing more.