Population Ethics and Different‐Number‐Based Imprecision. (22nd April 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Arrhenius, Gustaf
• Is Part Of: Theoria. Volume 82:Number 2(2016)
• Page Start: 166
• Page End: 181
• Publication Date: 2016-04-22
• Subjects: population ethics -- imprecision -- Different‐Number‐Based Imprecision -- Repugnant Conclusion -- impossibility theorems -- population paradoxes -- Derek Parfit; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Psychology -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/theo.12094
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0040-5825

Abstract

Abstract: Recently, in his Rolf Schock Prize Lecture, Derek Parfit has suggested a novel way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion by introducing what he calls "imprecision" in value comparisons. He suggests that in a range of important cases, populations of different sizes are only imprecisely comparable. Parfit suggests that this feature of value comparisons opens up a way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion without implying other counterintuitive conclusions, and thus solves one of the major challenges in ethics. In this article, I try to clarify Parfit's proposal and evaluate whether it will help us with the paradoxes in population ethics.