On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories. (2nd April 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Lazzeri, Filipe
• Is Part Of: Philosophical psychology. Volume 29:Number 3(2016)
• Page Start: 405
• Page End: 418
• Publication Date: 2016-04-02
• Subjects: Behavior -- behaviorism -- covert behavior -- embodied and enactive views -- psychological categories -- psychological phenomena -- objections to behaviorism; Psychology -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Psychology -- Methodology -- Periodicals; 150.1
• DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1121540
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0951-5089

Abstract

Abstract: This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis' "perfect actor" case and Kirk's "zombie"; (c) alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena without exhibiting any behavior associated with them, including Armstrong's imagined brain in a vat, Putnam's "super-super-spartans" scenario, and related cases; and (d) the holistic objection. Mistaken assumptions in each of these objections are pinpointed. The paper starts with a brief characterization of behaviorism about psychological categories and a summary of the particular version thereof supported here, which draws upon Ryle and Skinner, among others.