A virtue ethical approach to decisional capacity and mental health. (2nd April 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Ciurria, Michelle
• Is Part Of: Philosophical psychology. Volume 29:Number 3(2016)
• Page Start: 462
• Page End: 475
• Publication Date: 2016-04-02
• Subjects: Autonomy -- capability approach -- decisional capacity -- mental health -- psychological disorder -- virtue ethics; Psychology -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Psychology -- Methodology -- Periodicals; 150.1
• DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1100719
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0951-5089

Abstract

Abstract: It is a common assumption that lack of autonomy is incompatible with decisional capacity and mental health. However, there are two general conceptions of autonomy, one value-neutral and the other value-laden, which imply different notions of mental health. I argue that the value-neutral notion of autonomy is independently inadequate and that it also provides an inadequate foundation for judging whether someone is decisionally incapable or mentally disordered. I propose an alternative, value-laden account which posits ten capabilities required for basic human functioning. I then defend this account against objections and highlight its practical utility in designing optimal treatment.