A Vital Challenge to Materialism. (10th February 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Mulder, Jesse M.
• Is Part Of: Philosophy. Volume 91:Number 2(2016)
• Page Start: 153
• Page End: 182
• Publication Date: 2016-02-10
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1017/S0031819116000024
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8191

Abstract

Abstract: Life poses a threat to materialism. To understand the phenomena of animate nature, we make use of a teleological form of explanation that is peculiar to biology, of explanations in terms of what I call the 'vital categories' – and this holds even for accounts of underlying physico-chemical 'mechanisms'. The materialist claims that this teleological form of explanation does not capture what is metaphysically fundamental, whereas her preferred physical form of explanation does. In this essay, I do three things. (1) I argue that the 'vital categories', such as life form and life-process, do not reduce to the 'physical categories' and show that there are no grounds for the materialist's metaphysically limiting claim; (2) I sketch a positive view on how vital and physical explanations can both apply to a given phenomenon, and on how they interrelate; and (3) I show that this view meshes nicely with evolutionary theory, despite being committed to a form of 'biological essentialism'.