Bargaining within the Supply Chain and Its Implications in an Industry1. (2nd November 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Baron, Opher; Berman, Oded; Wu, Desheng
• Is Part Of: Decision sciences. Volume 47:Number 2(2016:Apr.)
• Page Start: 193
• Page End: 218
• Publication Date: 2015-11-02
• Subjects: Bargaining Power -- Competition -- Supply Chain Coordination; Decision making -- Periodicals; Policy sciences -- Periodicals; 658.40305
• DOI: 10.1111/deci.12189
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0011-7315

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Our main objective is to investigate the influence of the bargaining power within a chain on its industry. As a building block, we first discuss the implications of bargaining within a single chain by considering an asymmetric Nash bargaining over the wholesale price (BW). We show that both Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) and vertical integration (VI) strategies are special cases of the BW contract. We then develop the Nash equilibrium in an industry with two supply chains that use BW. We identify the profit‐maximizing (coordinating) bargaining power within this industry. We show that when a chain is not monopolistic, VI does not coordinate the chain and that the MS contract, where the manufacturer has all the bargaining power, is coordinating when competition is intense. We find that the main determinant of the equilibrium in mature industries is to respond well to the actions of the competing chain rather than to directly maximize the profit of each chain. That is, the equilibrium does not necessarily maximize the profit of the entire industry. While a coordination of the industry could then increase the profitability of both chains, such a coordination is likely against antitrust law. Moreover, if one chain cannot change its actions, the other chain may unilaterally improve its profitability by deviating from the equilibrium. Our results lead to several predictions supported by empirical findings, such as that in competitive industries chains will work "close to" the MS contract.