The psychologist who is not a psychologist: a deconstructive reading of Wolfgang Giegerich's idea of psychology proper1. Issue 2 (April 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Marlan, Stanton
• Is Part Of: Journal of analytical psychology. Volume 61:Issue 2(2016:Apr.)
• Page Start: 223
• Page End: 238
• Publication Date: 2016-04
• Subjects: alchemy -- Dionysian freedom -- Giegerich -- human all‐too‐human -- infinite interiority -- Mercurius -- neurosis -- psychology proper -- syzygy; Giegerich -- psychologie à proprement parler -- « humain rien qu'humain » -- Mercure -- alchimie -- syzygie -- névrose -- intériorité infinie; Giegerich -- wirkliche Psychologie -- menschlich allzu menschlich -- Merkur -- Alchemie -- Syzygie -- Neurose -- unendliche Innerlichkeit; Giegerich -- psicologia in sé -- umano troppo umano -- Mercurio -- alchimia -- sigizia -- nevrosi -- interiorità infinita; Гигерих -- собственно психология -- человеческое -- слишком человеческое -- Меркурий -- алхимия -- сизигия -- невроз -- бесконечное внутреннее; Giegerich -- psicología correcta -- humano demasiado‐humano -- Mercurius -- alquimia -- syzygy -- neurosis -- interioridad infinita; 吉格里希 -- 心理学之恰当 -- 人之太过于人性 -- 水银 -- 炼金术 -- 点金术 -- 神经症 -- 无限内在性; Jungian psychology -- Periodicals; 131.3405
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12212
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0021-8774

Abstract

Abstract: This paper represents an archetypal and deconstructive reading of the work of Wolfgang Giegerich. In an attempt to extend and philosophically develop Jung's late‐life view of the objective psyche, Giegerich, via Hegel, defines psychology proper as fundamentally separate from the everyday person and the 'human, all‐too‐human' aspects of the soul. It is argued that, in so doing, Giegerich removes the human person from being the primary focus of his psychology and creates instead a hierarchy of ideas and values privileging syntax over semantics, the logical over the empirical, and thinking over imagination. This bypasses the emotionality of the everyday person/patient and also renders psychology proper unable to address the day‐to‐day practice of the analyst. Giegerich attempts to rectify this problem by re‐incorporating what he had previously rejected, making his theory more complex than is apparent in his binary oppositions. In the end, however, it remains a question to what extent Giegerich is successful in avoiding a binary scission (Saban 2015) or a tendency to regularly de‐emphasize the human aspect of the soul (Hoedl 2015) in his need to continue to heroically push off from the ego seeking total freedom from neurosis and from our humanity.