Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of The In‐Between Account of Dissonance Cases. (27th May 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Borgoni, Cristina
• Is Part Of: Pacific philosophical quarterly. Volume 97:Number 1(2016:Mar.)
• Page Start: 48
• Page End: 57
• Publication Date: 2014-05-27
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/papq.12039
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0279-0750

Abstract

Abstract: In a dissonance case, a person sincerely and with conviction asserts that P, while his/her overall automatic behavior suggests that he/she believes that not‐ P . According to Schwitzgebel (2001, 2010), this is a case of in‐between believing. This article raises several concerns about Schwitzgebel's account and proposes an alternative view. I argue that the in‐between approach yields incorrect results in belief self‐ascriptions and does not capture the psychological conflict underlying the individual's dissonance. I advance the view that in relevant cases the dissonant individual has two mutually contradictory beliefs.