Can Institutional Reforms Reduce Corruption? Economic Theory and Patron–Client Politics in Developing Countries. Issue 2 (24th December 2015)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Can Institutional Reforms Reduce Corruption? Economic Theory and Patron–Client Politics in Developing Countries. Issue 2 (24th December 2015)
- Main Title:
- Can Institutional Reforms Reduce Corruption? Economic Theory and Patron–Client Politics in Developing Countries
- Authors:
- Uberti, Luca J.
- Abstract:
- ABSTRACT: The 'anti‐corruption consensus' of the dominant development paradigm sees corruption as a governance failure and maintains that graft can be reduced or eradicated through appropriate institutional reforms, such as strengthening the judiciary, designing corruption‐proof regulatory regimes, and establishing anti‐corruption agencies. This article aims to cast doubt on the theoretical rationale of this family of anti‐corruption interventions. The neo‐classical paradigm that informs the consensus is based on a set of unsatisfactory idealizations, which undermine the explanatory power of mainstream economic models of corruption. Drawing on insights from economic sociology and anthropology, the article develops an account of the relationship between corruption, cultural norms and patron–client politics in developing countries. This account shows that corruption is embedded in socio‐cultural structures that are endemic to the process of transition to industrial capitalism — a transition that all developing countries are arguably undergoing, however haltingly. This insight clarifies the theoretical limitations of mainstream corruption economics and provides a framework for constructing more empirically adequate explanations of corruption levels in specific countries. It also suggests that substantially reducing, let alone eradicating, corruption in the developing world may not be possible without fundamentally rethinking the existing set of anti‐corruption strategies andABSTRACT: The 'anti‐corruption consensus' of the dominant development paradigm sees corruption as a governance failure and maintains that graft can be reduced or eradicated through appropriate institutional reforms, such as strengthening the judiciary, designing corruption‐proof regulatory regimes, and establishing anti‐corruption agencies. This article aims to cast doubt on the theoretical rationale of this family of anti‐corruption interventions. The neo‐classical paradigm that informs the consensus is based on a set of unsatisfactory idealizations, which undermine the explanatory power of mainstream economic models of corruption. Drawing on insights from economic sociology and anthropology, the article develops an account of the relationship between corruption, cultural norms and patron–client politics in developing countries. This account shows that corruption is embedded in socio‐cultural structures that are endemic to the process of transition to industrial capitalism — a transition that all developing countries are arguably undergoing, however haltingly. This insight clarifies the theoretical limitations of mainstream corruption economics and provides a framework for constructing more empirically adequate explanations of corruption levels in specific countries. It also suggests that substantially reducing, let alone eradicating, corruption in the developing world may not be possible without fundamentally rethinking the existing set of anti‐corruption strategies and techniques. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Development and change. Volume 47:Issue 2(2016:Mar.)
- Journal:
- Development and change
- Issue:
- Volume 47:Issue 2(2016:Mar.)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 47, Issue 2 (2016)
- Year:
- 2016
- Volume:
- 47
- Issue:
- 2
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2016-0047-0002-0000
- Page Start:
- 317
- Page End:
- 345
- Publication Date:
- 2015-12-24
- Subjects:
- Social sciences -- Periodicals
Economic development -- Periodicals
Social change -- Periodicals
Developing countries -- Periodicals
303.483 - Journal URLs:
- http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/loi/dech ↗
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-7660 ↗
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1111/dech.12222 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0012-155X
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 3578.750000
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 1794.xml