"A temporary oversimplification": Mayr, Simpson, Dobzhansky, and the origins of the typology/population dichotomy (part 1 of 2). (December 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Witteveen, Joeri
• Is Part Of: Studies in history and philosophy of science. Volume 54(2016)
• Page Start: 20
• Page End: 33
• Publication Date: 2015-12
• Subjects: Typology -- Population thinking -- Ernst Mayr -- George Gaylord Simpson -- Theodosius Dobzhansky -- Modern Synthesis; Biology -- Periodicals; Natural history -- Periodicals; Biology -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Medicine -- History -- Periodicals; Medicine -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Bioethics -- Periodicals; Biologie -- Histoire -- Périodiques; Biologie -- Philosophie -- Périodiques; Sciences de la santé -- Histoire -- Périodiques; Sciences de la santé -- Philosophie -- Périodiques; Médecine -- Histoire -- Périodiques; Médecine -- Philosophie -- Périodiques; 570.1
• DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.09.007
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1369-8486

Abstract

Abstract: The dichotomy between 'typological thinking' and 'population thinking' features in a range of debates in contemporary and historical biology. The origins of this dichotomy are often traced to Ernst Mayr, who is said to have coined it in the 1950s as a rhetorical device that could be used to shield the Modern Synthesis from attacks by the opponents of population biology. In this two-part essay I argue that the origins of the typology/population dichotomy are considerably more complicated and more interesting than is commonly thought. In this first part, I will argue that Mayr's dichotomy was based on two distinct type/population contrasts that had been articulated much earlier by George Gaylord Simpson and Theodosius Dobzhansky. Their distinctions made eminent sense in their own, isolated contexts. In the second part, I will show how Mayr conflated these type/population distinctions and blended in some of his own, unrelated concerns with 'types' of a rather different sort. Although Mayr told his early critics that he was merely making "a temporary oversimplification, " he ended up burdening the history and philosophy of biology with a troubled dichotomy. Highlights: The origins of the type/population dichotomy are traced. This dichotomy did not originate with Ernst Mayr, as is commonly thought. Early type/population distinctions by Simpson and Dobzhansky are explicated. It is argued that Mayr confounded these independently meaningful distinctions. The role of the type/population distinction in the Coon Controversy is discussed.