Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control. (November 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pezzulo, Giovanni; Rigoli, Francesco; Friston, Karl
• Is Part Of: Progress in neurobiology. Volume 134(2015:Nov.)
• Page Start: 17
• Page End: 35
• Publication Date: 2015-11
• Subjects: CS conditioned stimuli -- US unconditioned stimulus -- PFC prefrontal cortex -- SMA supplemental motor area -- IC inferotemporal cortex -- AIC anterior insular cortex -- PMC/MC premotor/motor cortex -- ipoT ipothalamus -- ANS autonomous nervous system -- ACC anterior cingulate cortex -- PPC posterior parietal cortex -- VTA/SN the dopaminergic ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra; Active Inference -- Homeostatic regulation -- Adaptive control -- Model-based control -- Model-free control -- Pavlovian control; Neurobiology -- Periodicals; Neurology -- Periodicals; Neurology -- Periodicals; Neurobiologie -- Périodiques; 612.8
• DOI: 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2015.09.001
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0301-0082

Abstract

Highlights: An Active Inference account of homeostatic regulation and behavioural control. Pavlovian, habitual and goal-directed behaviours explained with one scheme. A possible phylogenetic trajectory from simpler to hierarchical controllers. Precision-dependent processes regulate habitual and goal-directed behaviour. Abstract: We review a theory of homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control within the Active Inference framework. Our aim is to connect two research streams that are usually considered independently; namely, Active Inference and associative learning theories of animal behaviour. The former uses a probabilistic (Bayesian) formulation of perception and action, while the latter calls on multiple (Pavlovian, habitual, goal-directed) processes for homeostatic and behavioural control. We offer a synthesis these classical processes and cast them as successive hierarchical contextualisations of sensorimotor constructs, using the generative models that underpin Active Inference. This dissolves any apparent mechanistic distinction between the optimization processes that mediate classical control or learning. Furthermore, we generalize the scope of Active Inference by emphasizing interoceptive inference and homeostatic regulation. The ensuing homeostatic (or allostatic) perspective provides an intuitive explanation for how priors act as drives or goals to enslave action, and emphasises the embodied nature of inference.