There aren't plenty more fish in the sea: A causal network approach. (17th January 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Nikolic, Milena; Lagnado, David A.
• Is Part Of: British journal of psychology. Volume 106:Part 4(2015:Nov.)
• Page Start: 564
• Page End: 582
• Publication Date: 2015-01-17
• Subjects: Psychology -- Periodicals; 150.5
• DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12113
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0007-1269

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main" id="bjop12113-abs-0001"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <p>The current research investigated how lay representations of the causes of an environmental problem may underlie individuals' reasoning about the issue. Naïve participants completed an experiment that involved two main tasks. The causal diagram task required participants to depict the causal relations between a set of factors related to overfishing and to estimate the strength of these relations. The counterfactual task required participants to judge the effect of counterfactual suppositions based on the diagrammed factors. We explored two major questions: (1) what is the relation between individual causal models and counterfactual judgments? Consistent with previous findings (e.g., Green <italic>et al</italic>., 1998, <italic>Br. J. Soc. Psychology</italic>, 37, 415), these judgments were best explained by a combination of the strength of both direct and indirect causal paths. (2) To what extent do people use two‐way causal thinking when reasoning about an environmental problem? In contrast to previous research (e.g., White, 2008, <italic>Appl. Cogn. Psychology</italic>, 22, 559), analyses based on individual causal networks revealed the presence of numerous feedback loops. The studies support the value of analysing individual causal models in contrast to consensual representations. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed in relation to causal reasoning as well as environmental psychology.</p> </abstract>