Truncated differential cryptanalysis of PRINCE. Issue 16 (10th February 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Zhao, Guangyao; Sun, Bing; Li, Chao; Su, Jinshu
• Is Part Of: Security and communication networks. Volume 8:Issue 16(2015)
• Page Start: 2875
• Page End: 2887
• Publication Date: 2015-02-10
• Subjects: Computer networks -- Security measures -- Periodicals; Computer security -- Periodicals; Cryptography -- Periodicals; 005.805
• DOI: 10.1002/sec.1213
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1939-0114

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main" id="sec1213-abs-0001"> <title>Abstract</title> <p id="sec1213-para-0001">PRINCE is a lightweight block cipher whose block size and key size are 64‐bit and 128‐bit, respectively. The core component of PRINCE is PRINCE <inline-formula><alternatives><inline-graphic mimetype="image" xlink:href="ark:/27927/pgkg3jp0k8" xlink:type="simple" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" /><mml:math display="inline" altimg="urn:x-wiley:sec:media:sec1213:sec1213-math-0001" overflow="scroll" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mrow><mml:mspace width="0.3em" /></mml:mrow><mml:mrow><mml:mi>core</mml:mi></mml:mrow></mml:msub></mml:math></alternatives></inline-formula> which is wrapped by the initial and final key whitening. PRINCE<sub><italic>c</italic><italic>o</italic><italic>r</italic><italic>e</italic></sub> adopts a 12‐round SPN structure. This paper exploits some new vulnerabilities of PRINCE from an aspect different from previous results, and applies truncated differential cryptanalysis to PRINCE. The result demonstrates that for several reduced versions of PRINCE, there exist 5‐round and 6‐round (out of 12 rounds) truncated differential distinguishers. We introduce a key‐recovery attack on 7‐round PRINCE<sub><italic>c</italic><italic>o</italic><italic>r</italic><italic>e</italic></sub> using two 5‐round distinguishers, the data complexity is 2<sup>50</sup> chosen plaintexts and the time complexity is 2<sup>48.2</sup> 7‐round encryptions, with a storage of about 2<sup>22.6</sup> counters. Both the distinguishers and key‐recovery attacks are not related to the value of <italic>α</italic>. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</p> </abstract>