Dynamic voting in clubs. Issue 3 (September 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Roberts, Kevin
• Is Part Of: Research in economics. Volume 69:Issue 3(2015)
• Page Start: 320
• Page End: 335
• Publication Date: 2015-09
• Subjects: Economics -- Periodicals; Économie politique -- Périodiques; 330.05
• DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2015.02.004
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1090-9443

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="author" id="ab0005"> <title id="sect0005">Abstract</title> <sec> <p id="sp1010">This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by its set of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate is endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers' cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterized. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analyzed in detail.</p> </sec> </abstract>