LABOR SUPPLY OF POLITICIANS. Issue 5 (5th June 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Fisman, Raymond; Harmon, Nikolaj A.; Kamenica, Emir; Munk, Inger
• Is Part Of: Journal of the European Economic Association. Volume 13:Issue 5(2015:Oct.)
• Page Start: 871
• Page End: 905
• Publication Date: 2015-06-05
• Subjects: Economics -- Periodicals; Économie politique -- Périodiques; Science économique; Périodique électronique (Descripteur de forme); Ressource Internet (Descripteur de forme); 330
• DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12141
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1542-4766

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences‐in‐differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for re‐election but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislation output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.</p> </abstract>