Aristotle on Predication. (27th August 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Corkum, Phil
• Is Part Of: European journal of philosophy. Volume 23:Number 3(2015:Sep.)
• Page Start: 793
• Page End: 813
• Publication Date: 2013-08-27
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, European -- Periodicals; Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century -- Periodicals; 190
• DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12054
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0966-8373

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the view that subjects and predicates refer. If this is correct, then it seems that Aristotle, like the traditional term logician, problematically conflates predication and identity claims. I will argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I will argue that Aristotle's core semantic notion is not <italic>identity</italic> but the weaker relation of <italic>constitution</italic>. For example, the predication 'All men are mortal' expresses a true thought, in Aristotle's view, just in case the mereological sum of humans is a part of the mereological sum of mortals.</p> </abstract>