Maximum impact for minimum subsidy: reverse auctions for universal access in Chile and India. Issue 5 (19th August 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Wu, Irene; Blackman, Colin; Blackman, Colin
• Is Part Of: Info. Volume 16:Issue 5(2014)
• Publication Date: 2014-08-19
• Subjects: Telecommunication -- Periodicals; Mass media -- Periodicals; Information policy -- Periodicals; Information technology -- Periodicals; 384.04105
• DOI: 10.1108/info-06-2013-0037
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1463-6697

Abstract

<abstract> <title> <x content-type="archive" xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <sec sec-type="purpose"> <title>Purpose</title> <p>In a minimum subsidy auction (also known as a reverse auction), the government starts by offering the maximum funds available for a given public project; the company requiring smallest subsidy wins. This article discusses how such auctions have been implemented in Chile and India for Internet and mobile phone infrastructure; and identifies lessons for governments considering reverse auctions as a tool. </p> </sec> <sec sec-type="design|methodology|approach"> <title>Design/methodology/approach</title> <p>The article investigates several case studies of subsidy auctions in both Chile and India.</p> </sec> <sec sec-type="findings"> <title>Findings</title> <p>When firms compete for subsidies in a reverse auctions, they have incentives to get the most result for the least funds. This furthers the government's goal to achieve maximum public policy impact with minimum budget.</p> </sec> <sec sec-type="originality|value"> <title>Originality/value</title> <p>For developing countries, very little research has been done on implementation of auctions in the communications sector.</p> </sec> </abstract>