ARGUMENTATION AND THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF REASONS. (26th March 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Lackey, Jennifer; Rysiew, Patrick
• Is Part Of: Episteme. Volume 12:Number 2(2015)
• Page Start: 309
• Page End: 317
• Publication Date: 2015-03-26
• Subjects: Social epistemology -- Periodicals; 121
• DOI: 10.1017/epi.2015.5
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1742-3600

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="normal"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>Jennifer Nagel suggests that Mercier and Sperber's argumentative theory of reasoning can shed light on "why we commonly think of perceptually and testimonially supported judgments as justified despite feeling worried, on reflection, that only what is internally available can justify". While I agree that there is indeed a natural path (or paths) from the argumentative theory to this asymmetry, and instability, in our epistemic judgments, I am not sure that it is quite the one that Nagel identifies. Having registered some reservations about Nagel's account, I make an alternative suggestion as to how the argumentative theory might help to explain the naturalness of the relevant judgments.</p> </abstract>