The Economics of Counterfeiting. Issue 3 (May 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Quercioli, Elena; Smith, Lones
• Is Part Of: Econometrica. Volume 83:Issue 3(2015:May)
• Page Start: 1211
• Page End: 1236
• Publication Date: 2015-05
• Subjects: Econometrics -- Periodicals; Economics, Mathematical -- Periodicals; Economics -- Periodicals; Économétrie -- Périodiques; Mathématiques économiques -- Périodiques; Économie politique -- Périodiques; 330.05
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA10975
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0012-9682

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <p>We develop a strategic theory of counterfeiting as a multi‐market large game. Bad guys choose whether to counterfeit, and what quality to produce. Opposing them is a continuum of good guys who select a costly verification effort. In equilibrium, counterfeiters produce better quality at higher notes, but verifiers try sufficiently harder that verification still improves. We develop a graphical framework for deducing comparative statics. Passed and counterfeiting rates vanish for low and high notes. Our predictions are consistent with time series and cross‐sectional patterns in a unique data set assembled largely from the Secret Service.</p> </abstract>