Incentives and Selection in Promotion Contests: Is It Possible to Kill Two Birds with One Stone?. (2nd May 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Stracke, Rudi; Höchtl, Wolfgang; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sunde, Uwe
• Is Part Of: Managerial and decision economics. Volume 36:Number 5(2015)
• Page Start: 275
• Page End: 285
• Publication Date: 2014-05-02
• Subjects: Managerial economics -- Periodicals; Decision making -- Periodicals; Management -- Periodicals; 658.15
• DOI: 10.1002/mde.2666
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0143-6570

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <p>This paper investigates whether a designer can improve both the incentive provision and the selection performance of a promotion contest by making the competition more (or less) dynamic. A comparison of static (one‐stage) and dynamic (two‐stage) contests reveals that this is not the case. A structural change that improves the performance in one dimension leads to a deterioration in the other dimension. This suggests that modifications of the contest structure are an alternative to strategic handicaps. A key advantage of structural handicaps over participant‐specific ones is that the implementation of the former does not require prior identification of worker types. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p> </abstract>