Maximum Likelihood Social Choice Rule. (26th February 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Nakamura, Yuta
• Is Part Of: Japanese economic review. Volume 66:Number 2(2015:Jun.)
• Page Start: 271
• Page End: 284
• Publication Date: 2015-02-26
• Subjects: Economics -- Periodicals; 330
• DOI: 10.1111/jere.12065
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1352-4739

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <p>This study is related to a Condorcetian problem of information aggregation that finds a "true" social ordering using individual orderings, that are supposed to partly contain the "truth". In this problem, we introduce a new maximum likelihood rule and analyse its performance. This rule selects an alternative that maximizes the probability of realizing individual orderings, conditional on the alternative being the top according to a true social ordering. We show that under a neutrality condition of alternatives, the probability that our rule selects the true top alternative is higher than that of any other rule.</p> </abstract>