Dissonance and Moorean Propositions. (March 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Borgoni, Cristina
• Is Part Of: Dialectica. Volume 69:Fascicule 1(2015)
• Page Start: 107
• Page End: 127
• Publication Date: 2015-03
• Subjects: Psychology -- Periodicals; Dialectic -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12095
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0012-2017

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>In a dissonance case, a person sincerely and with conviction asserts that <italic>P</italic>, while her overall automatic behaviour suggests that she believes that not‐<italic>P</italic>. In contrast with several mainstream views, this paper defends the contradictory‐belief view of some relevant dissonance cases and explores its consequences regarding Moorean propositions. The paper argues that in relevant cases, the dissonant person is justified in asserting (or believing) a Moorean proposition on the grounds of her explicit view on the subject matter and the recognition of her opposing beliefs. The person is irrational in being dissonant, but not in asserting a Moorean proposition.</p> </abstract>