Defending Truthmaker Non‐Maximalism. (5th December 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Simpson, Matthew
• Is Part Of: Thought. Volume 3:Number 4(2014:Dec.)
• Page Start: 288
• Page End: 291
• Publication Date: 2014-12-05
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Logic -- Periodicals; Knowledge, Theory of -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1002/tht3.144
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2161-2234

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>Jago (2012) argues that truthmaker non‐maximalism, the view that some but not all truths require truthmakers, is vulnerable to a challenge from truths which ascribe knowledge of propositions about things which don't exist. Such truths, Jago argues, can only be dealt with using maximalist resources. I argue that Jago's point relies on the claim that the relevant truths require truthmakers, a point that non‐maximalists can coherently and plausibly deny. Moreover, I argue that by making use of a safety account of knowledge, non‐maximalists can fully answer Jago's challenge.</p> </abstract>