CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND INFORMATION REVELATION IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS. (18th November 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Saini, Viplav; Suter, Jordan F.
• Is Part Of: Economic inquiry. Volume 53:Number 2(2015:Apr.)
• Page Start: 1236
• Page End: 1258
• Publication Date: 2014-11-18
• Subjects: Economics -- Periodicals; 330.05
• DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12158
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0095-2583

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main" id="ecin12158-abs-0001"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <p id="ecin12158-para-0001"> <italic>We utilize laboratory experiments to study behavior in sequential procurement auctions where winning an auction round increases a bidder's future costs. The game admits competitive as well as bid‐rotation style collusive equilibria. We find that (a) bidders show some propensity to account for the opportunity cost of winning an auction, but underestimate its magnitude; (b) revealing all bids (instead of only the winning bid) after each round leads to dramatically higher procurement costs. The rise in procurement costs is accompanied by an increase in very high (extreme) bids, a fraction of which appear to be collusive in nature</italic>. (<italic>JEL</italic> C91, D44, L44)</p> </abstract>