Autonomy, Natality and Freedom: A Liberal Re‐examination of Habermas in the Enhancement Debate. (19th February 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pugh, Jonathan
• Is Part Of: Bioethics. Volume 29:Number 3(2015:Mar.)
• Page Start: 145
• Page End: 152
• Publication Date: 2014-02-19
• Subjects: Bioethics -- Periodicals; 174.957
• DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12082
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0269-9702

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre‐natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments 'the argument from negative freedom' and 'the argument from natality'. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments.</p> </abstract>