Assertions Only?. (5th September 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bronner, Ben
• Is Part Of: Thought. Volume 2:Number 1(2013:Mar.)
• Page Start: 44
• Page End: 52
• Publication Date: 2013-09-05
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Logic -- Periodicals; Knowledge, Theory of -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1002/tht3.58
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2161-2234

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main" id="tht358-abs-0001"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <p id="tht358-para-0001">It is standardly believed that the only way to justify an assertion in the face of a challenge is by making another assertion. Call this claim <sc>assertions only</sc>. Besides its intrinsic interest, <sc>assertions only</sc> is relevant to deciding between competing views of the norms that govern reasoned discourse. <sc>assertions only</sc> is also a crucial part of the motivation for infinitism and Pyrrhonian skepticism. I suggest that <sc>assertions only</sc> is false: I can justify an assertion by drawing attention to something that clearly makes the assertion true, or likely true.</p> </abstract>