Powers, Necessity, and Determinism. (September 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Franklin, Christopher Evan
• Is Part Of: Thought. Volume 3:Number 3(2014:Sep.)
• Page Start: 225
• Page End: 229
• Publication Date: 2014-09
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Logic -- Periodicals; Knowledge, Theory of -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1002/tht3.139
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2161-2234

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main" id="tht3139-abs-0001"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <p id="tht3139-para-0001">Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum have argued that a theory of free will that appeals to a powers‐based ontology is incompatible with causal determinism. This is a surprising conclusion since much recent work on the intersection of the metaphysics of powers and free will has consisted of attempts to defend compatibilism by appealing to a powers‐based ontology. In response I show that their argument turns on an equivocation of 'all events are necessitated'.</p> </abstract>