Are Bald‐Faced Lies Deceptive after All?. (3rd April 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Fallis, Don
• Is Part Of: Ratio. Volume 28:Number 1(2015:Mar.)
• Page Start: 81
• Page End: 96
• Publication Date: 2014-04-03
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Analysis (Philosophy) -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/rati.12055
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0034-0006

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>According to the traditional philosophical definition, you <italic>lie</italic> if and only if you say something that you believe to be false and you intend to deceive someone into believing what you say. However, philosophers have recently noted the existence of <italic>bald‐faced lies</italic>, lies which are not intended to deceive anyone into believing what is said. As a result, many philosophers have removed deception from their definitions of lying. According to Jennifer Lackey, this is 'an unhappy divorce' because it precludes an obvious explanation of the <italic>prima facie</italic> wrongness of lying. Moreover, Lackey claims that there <italic>is</italic> a sense of deception in which all lies are deceptive. In this paper, I argue that bald‐faced lies are not deceptive on any plausible notion of deception. In addition, I argue that divorcing deception from lying may not be as unhappy a result as Lackey suggests.</p> </abstract>