Channel Choice, Justification of Deception, and Detection. (27th October 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Van Swol, Lyn M.; Braun, Michael T.
• Is Part Of: Journal of communication. Volume 64:Number 6(2014:Dec.)
• Page Start: 1139
• Page End: 1159
• Publication Date: 2014-10-27
• Subjects: Communication -- Periodicals; Communication and traffic -- Periodicals; Information theory -- Periodicals; Mass media -- Periodicals; 302.2
• DOI: 10.1111/jcom.12125
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0021-9916

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main" id="jcom12125-abs-0001"> <title>Abstract</title> <p id="jcom12125-para-0001">Using Truth Default Theory, we assess whether senders choose to communicate through anonymous text chat or face‐to‐face when they deceive, and differences in receiver ability to detect deception in the 2 channels. Participants were randomly assigned as distributor or receiver in an ultimatum game. Distributors received $8 to divide between self and receiver. Receivers did not know the amount distributors had received, so distributors could deceive. Distributors used text chat more for deceptive offers; receivers were more accurate at detecting deception through text chat than face‐to‐face. When part of the distributor's allocation appeared to be won through luck, distributors were more deceptive. Distributors with more dishonest demeanors increased suspicion, but demeanor was not significantly related to detection accuracy.</p> </abstract>