Colour. Issue 11 (November 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Gow, Laura
• Is Part Of: Philosophy compass. Volume 9:Issue 11(2014:Nov.)
• Page Start: 803
• Page End: 813
• Publication Date: 2014-11
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12173
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1747-9991

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>The view that physical objects do not, in fact, possess colour properties is certainly the dominant position amongst scientists working on colour vision. It is also a reasonably popular view amongst philosophers. However, the recent philosophical debate about the metaphysical status of colour properties seems to have taken a more <italic>realist</italic> turn. In this article, I review the main philosophical views – eliminativism, physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism – and describe the problems they face. I also examine how these views have been classified and suggest that there may be less disparity between some of these positions than previously thought.</p> </abstract>