No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology. (24th August 2012)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Baumann, Peter
• Is Part Of: Philosophy and phenomenological research. Volume 89:Number 3(2014)
• Page Start: 523
• Page End: 551
• Publication Date: 2012-08-24
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Phenomenology -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00622.x
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8205

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main" xml:lang="en"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <p>Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck (of a certain, interesting kind). This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are "lucky" in that sense. In the second part, I look at philosophical conceptions of luck (modal and probabilistic ones) and come to the conclusion that knowledge can be lucky in those senses, too. I also turns out that a probabilistic notion of luck can help us see in what ways a particular piece of knowledge or belief can be lucky or not lucky.</p> </abstract>