SHOULD SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES BE SHARP?. (30th April 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bradley, Seamus; Steele, Katie
• Is Part Of: Episteme. Volume 11:Number 3(2014)
• Page Start: 277
• Page End: 289
• Publication Date: 2014-04-30
• Subjects: Social epistemology -- Periodicals; 121
• DOI: 10.1017/epi.2014.8
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1742-3600

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="normal"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>There has been much recent interest in <italic>imprecise probabilities</italic>, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga (2010), that subjective probabilities <italic>need not</italic> be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. We argue that these assumptions are too strong and that rational imprecise choice is possible in the absence of these overly strong conditions.</p> </abstract>