In Defence of My Favourite Theory. (3rd March 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Gustafsson, Johan E.; Torpman, Olle
• Is Part Of: Pacific philosophical quarterly. Volume 95:Number 2(2014:Jun.)
• Page Start: 159
• Page End: 174
• Publication Date: 2014-03-03
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/papq.12022
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0279-0750

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible moral theory. In defence of this principle, we argue that it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying on intertheoretic comparisons of value, while its main rivals are either plagued by moral analogues of money pumps or in need of a method for making non‐arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons. We rebut the arguments that have been levelled against My Favourite Theory and offer some arguments against intertheoretic comparisons of value.</p> </abstract>