No Simples, No Gunk, No Nothing. (3rd March 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Cowling, Sam
• Is Part Of: Pacific philosophical quarterly. Volume 95:Number 2(2014:Jun.)
• Page Start: 246
• Page End: 260
• Publication Date: 2014-03-03
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/papq.12027
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0279-0750

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>Mereological realism holds that the world has a mereological structure – i.e. a distribution of mereological properties and relations. In this article, I defend Eleaticism about properties, according to which there are no causally inert non‐logical properties. I then present an Eleatic argument for mereological anti‐realism, which denies the existence of both mereological composites and mereological simples. After defending Eleaticism and mereological anti‐realism, I argue that mereological anti‐realism is preferable to mereological nihilism. I then conclude by examining the thesis that composition is identity and noting its consequences for the question of mereological structure.</p> </abstract>