Contextualising Causation Part II. Issue 11 (4th November 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Reiss, Julian
• Is Part Of: Philosophy compass. Volume 8:Issue 11(2013:Nov.)
• Page Start: 1076
• Page End: 1090
• Publication Date: 2013-11-04
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12073
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1747-9991

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>In recent years, a number of philosophers have attempted to fix paradoxes of the counterfactual account of causation by making causation contrastive. In this framework, causation is understood to be not a two‐place relationship between a cause and an effect but a three or four‐place relationship between a cause, an effect and a contrast on the side of the cause, the effect or both. I argue that contrasting helps resolving certain paradoxes only if an account of admissibility of the chosen set of contrasts is given. I show by means of numerous examples that it is contextual features that determine admissibility. This way, context becomes part of the semantics of causation. I finally argue that once contextualised, explicit contrasting is redundant: causation is therefore a three‐place relationship between a cause, an effect and a context.</p> </abstract>