Every Choice Function Is Backwards‐Induction Rationalizable. Issue 6 (November 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves
• Is Part Of: Econometrica. Volume 81:Issue 6(2013:Nov.)
• Page Start: 2521
• Page End: 2534
• Publication Date: 2013-11
• Subjects: Econometrics -- Periodicals; Economics, Mathematical -- Periodicals; Economics -- Periodicals; Économétrie -- Périodiques; Mathématiques économiques -- Périodiques; Économie politique -- Périodiques; 330.05
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11419
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0012-9682

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main" xml:lang="en"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <p>A choice function is backwards‐induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect‐information extensive‐form game such that for each subset of alternatives, the backwards‐induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every choice function is backwards‐induction rationalizable.</p> </abstract>