Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch. (16th September 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Deutscher, Christian; Frick, Bernd; Gürtler, Oliver; Prinz, Joachim
• Is Part Of: Scandinavian journal of economics. Volume 115:Number 4(2013:Dec.)
• Page Start: 1138
• Page End: 1157
• Publication Date: 2013-09-16
• Subjects: Economics -- Periodicals; 330.05
• DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12036
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0347-0520

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>In this paper, we address the problem of sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants. In a first step, we develop a formal model, which yields the prediction that favorites exert higher productive effort, while underdogs are more tempted to engage in destructive actions (sabotage). This is because favorites have a higher return on productive effort and both types of effort are substitutes. In a second step, we use data from German professional soccer to test this prediction. In line with the model, we find that favorite teams win more tackles in a fair way, while underdog teams commit more fouls.</p> </abstract>