In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy. (3rd July 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Rose, David; Danks, David
• Is Part Of: Metaphilosophy. Volume 44:Number 4(2013:Jul.)
• Page Start: 512
• Page End: 532
• Publication Date: 2013-07-03
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/meta.12045
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0026-1068

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>Experimental philosophy is often presented as a new movement that avoids many of the difficulties that face traditional philosophy. This article distinguishes two views of experimental philosophy: a narrow view in which philosophers conduct empirical investigations of intuitions, and a broad view which says that experimental philosophy is just the colocation in the same body of (i) philosophical naturalism and (ii) the actual practice of cognitive science. These two positions are rarely clearly distinguished in the literature about experimental philosophy, both pro and con. The article argues, first, that the broader view is the only plausible one; discussions of experimental philosophy should recognize that the narrow view is a caricature of experimental philosophy as it is currently done. It then shows both how objections to experimental philosophy are transformed and how positive recommendations can be provided by adopting a broad conception of experimental philosophy.</p> </abstract>