The Role of Party: The Legislative Consequences of Partisan Electoral Competition. Issue 1 (17th January 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Carroll, Royce; Eichorst, Jason
• Is Part Of: Legislative studies quarterly. Volume 38:Issue 1(2013:Feb.)
• Page Start: 83
• Page End: 109
• Publication Date: 2013-01-17
• Subjects: Legislative bodies -- Periodicals; Parlement; Procédure législative; Système parlementaire; Étude comparée (Descripteur de forme); Périodique électronique (Descripteur de forme); Ressource Internet (Descripteur de forme); 328
• DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12004
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0362-9805

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <p>We examine the proposition that incentives for legislative organization can be explained by the nature of electoral competition. We argue that legislators in environments where parties are competitive for majority status are most likely to have delegated power to their leadership to constrain individualistic behavior within their party, which will in turn increase the spatial predictability of individual voting patterns. Using roll‐call votes and district‐level electoral data from the U.S. state legislatures, we show empirically that increased statewide interparty competition corresponds to more predictable voting behavior overall, while legislators from competitive districts and those in the minority party have less predictable behavior.</p> </abstract>