Was Mill a Noncognitivist?. Issue 2 (3rd June 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Macleod, Christopher
• Is Part Of: Southern journal of philosophy. Volume 51:Issue 2(2013)
• Page Start: 206
• Page End: 223
• Publication Date: 2013-06-03
• Subjects: 105
• DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12011
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0038-4283

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical noncognitivism. I argue that the evidence traditionally cited for this interpretation is not convincing and suggest that we should instead remain open to a cognitivist reading. I begin by laying out the "received view" of Mill on the status of practical norms, as given by Alan Ryan in the 1970s. I then argue that there is no firm textual evidence for this reading of Mill: his remarks on "art" and "science" do not show the metaethical commitments they have been taken to. Neither is there firm <italic>textual</italic> evidence for a cognitivist reading. However, a noncognitivist interpretation suffers from the fault of anachronism and is difficult to reconcile with the clear commitment in <italic>Utilitarianism</italic> to the possibility of evidence being given for the desirability of pleasure. A cognitivist reading would not suffer from these faults, and on that basis, I conclude that we should think further about what a cognitivist reading of Mill might amount to.</p> </abstract>