Choosing between the government and the regions: An empirical analysis of the Italian constitutional court decisions. (19th November 2012)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pellegrina, Lucia Dalla; Garoupa, Nuno
• Is Part Of: European journal of political research. Volume 52:Number 4(2013)
• Page Start: 558
• Page End: 580
• Publication Date: 2012-11-19
• Subjects: Political science -- Research -- Europe -- Periodicals; 320.05
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12003
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0304-4130

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>In this article the extent to which political variables can explain the behaviour of constitutional judges in Italy when dealing with conflicts between the central government and regions is explored. Two competing hypotheses are tested. One hypothesis argues that one should expect some alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government primarily due to the appointment mechanism. The other hypothesis suggests that there should be no systematic alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government. Unlike previous literature, the empirical results presented in this article seem to confirm that when the Rapporteur and the court's majority are allegedly affiliated with the Prime Minister's coalition, the odds of success of the Prime Minister go up.</p> </abstract>