Elections and the Politics of Pork in the U.S. Senate1. (22nd June 2012)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Crespin, Michael H.; Finocchiaro, Charles J.
• Is Part Of: Social science quarterly. Volume 94:Number 2(2013)
• Page Start: 506
• Page End: 529
• Publication Date: 2012-06-22
• Subjects: Political science -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Periodicals; 300
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2012.00875.x
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0038-4941

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <sec id="ssqu875-sec-0010" sec-type="section"> <title>Objectives</title> <p>We examine the connection between pork‐barrel projects and the election returns of members of the U.S. Congress. While previous researchers have uncovered little evidence of a direct link, we refine the perspective that pork has electoral implications by advancing the argument that its effects differ across geographic and partisan contexts.</p> </sec> <sec id="ssqu875-sec-0020" sec-type="section"> <title>Methods</title> <p>Our empirical analysis focuses on the Senate—which has largely escaped attention—and utilizes a measure of pork that includes only those projects inserted by legislators as line items in appropriation bills from 1996 to 2004.</p> </sec> <sec id="ssqu875-sec-0030" sec-type="section"> <title>Results</title> <p>We find a direct relationship between pork and electoral performance, albeit one that is conditioned upon ideological congruence, constituency size, and the political ideology of the legislator.</p> </sec> <sec id="ssqu875-sec-0040" sec-type="section"> <title>Conclusions</title> <p>Electoral payoffs for pork‐barreling accrue to some but not all senators. Moreover, our findings demonstrate the pragmatic rationale for conservative opposition to earmarks.</p> </sec> </abstract>