Knowledge and Dogmatism. (4th September 2012)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Baumann, Peter
• Is Part Of: Philosophical quarterly. Volume 63:Number 250(2013:Jan.)
• Page Start: 1
• Page End: 19
• Publication Date: 2012-09-04
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00104.x
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8094

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main" id="phiq104-abs-0001"> <title> <x xml:space="preserve">Abstract</x> </title> <p> <italic>There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything</italic>.<italic>I distinguish between different versions of the puzzle (mainly a 'permissibility' version and a 'closure' version) and offer a solution for one version (the permissibility version) of the problem. No matter how much a subject knows, knowledge never gives one a license to ignore evidence against a proposition. Premise (1) of the argument is false and the puzzle can thus be resolved</italic>.</p> </abstract>