Wittgenstein, Religious "Passion, " and Fundamentalism. Issue 2 (15th April 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Plant, Bob
• Is Part Of: Journal of religious ethics. Volume 41:Issue 2(2013)
• Page Start: 280
• Page End: 309
• Publication Date: 2013-04-15
• Subjects: Ethics -- Periodicals; Religious ethics -- Periodicals; Morale religieuse; Religion; Théologie; 205
• DOI: 10.1111/jore.12014
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0384-9694

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>Notwithstanding his own spiritual inadequacies, Wittgenstein has a profound respect for those capable of living a <italic>genuinely</italic> religious life; namely, those whose "passionate, " "loving" faith demands unconditional existential commitment. In contrast, he disapproves of those who see religious belief as hypothetical, reasonable, or dependent on empirical evidence. Drawing primarily on <italic>Culture and Value</italic>, "Lectures on Religious Belief, " and <italic>On Certainty</italic>, in this essay I defend two claims: (1) that there is an unresolved tension between Wittgenstein's later descriptive‐therapeutic approach and the implicit normativity of his conception of genuine/passionate religious belief; and (2) that the demarcation between the latter and its pseudo‐religious counterpart is itself problematic. To illustrate these claims I argue that apocalyptic Christian fundamentalism presents a significant challenge to Wittgenstein's taxonomy. Despite these shortcomings, however, I conclude by suggesting that his characterization of religious belief as a "passion" or "love" remains valuable.</p> </abstract>