"Part of the Very Concept": Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy1. (26th February 2012)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Carter, Drew
• Is Part Of: Philosophical investigations. Volume 36:Number 1(2013:Jan.)
• Page Start: 37
• Page End: 55
• Publication Date: 2012-02-26
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2011.01467.x
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0190-0536

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main" xml:lang="en"> <title>Abstract</title> <p> <italic>X</italic> is "part of the very concept" of <italic>Y</italic>. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond Gaita's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's. I elucidate the formulation's meaning and the nature of the necessity posited, then conclude with a criticism. One cannot love evil. One cannot love cow dung. For Gaita, these claims differ in type. The first testifies to a conceptual relation, but the second to a "mere fact." I see no clear basis for assigning to claims one type over another, which challenges the footing of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Why do no <italic>moral</italic>"mere facts" partly define our form of life?</p> </abstract>