Third Parties and the Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness. Issue 3 (18th July 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Walker, Margaret Urban
• Is Part Of: Journal of religious ethics. Volume 41:Issue 3(2013)
• Page Start: 495
• Page End: 512
• Publication Date: 2013-07-18
• Subjects: Ethics -- Periodicals; Religious ethics -- Periodicals; Morale religieuse; Religion; Théologie; 205
• DOI: 10.1111/jore.12026
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0384-9694

Abstract

<abstract abstract-type="main"> <title>Abstract</title> <p>It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended "third‐party forgiveness, " the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third‐party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb severe and inescapable costs of distinctive kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive.</p> </abstract>