Cyber-security in critical infrastructures : a game-theoretic approach /: a game-theoretic approach. (2020)
- Record Type:
- Book
- Title:
- Cyber-security in critical infrastructures : a game-theoretic approach /: a game-theoretic approach. (2020)
- Main Title:
- Cyber-security in critical infrastructures : a game-theoretic approach
- Further Information:
- Note: Stefan Rass, Stefan Schauer, Sandra König, Quanyan Zhu.
- Other Names:
- Rass, Stefan
Schauer, Stefan
König, Sandra
Zhu, Quanyan - Contents:
- Intro -- Contents -- Part I Introduction -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 What are Critical Infrastructures? -- 1.2 Security Challenges for Critical Infrastructures -- 1.2.1 Natural and Physical Threats -- 1.2.1.1 Natural Disasters -- 1.2.1.2 Technical Failures -- 1.2.1.3 Disruptions and Outages -- 1.2.2 Cyber Threats -- 1.2.2.1 Distributed Denial of Service -- 1.2.2.2 Malware and Ransomware -- 1.2.2.3 Spear Phishing Attacks -- 1.2.2.4 Social Engineering -- 1.3 Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) -- 1.3.1 Characteristics -- 1.3.2 Life-Cycle -- 1.3.2.1 Step 1: Reconnaissance 1.3.2.2 Step 2: Initial Compromise -- 1.3.2.3 Step 3: Establish Foothold -- 1.3.2.4 Step 4: Escalate Privileges -- 1.3.2.5 Step 5: Internal Reconnaissance -- 1.3.2.6 Step 6: Move Laterally -- 1.3.2.7 Step 7: Maintain Presence -- 1.3.2.8 Step 8: Complete Mission -- 1.3.2.9 Step 9: Cover Tracks -- 1.4 Selected Real-Life Incidents -- 1.4.1 The Blackout in Italy (2003) -- 1.4.2 The Transportation Gridlock in Switzerland (2005) -- 1.4.3 The Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid (2015) -- 1.4.4 The WannaCry and NotPetya Malware Infections(2017) -- 1.4.5 The Blackout in Venezuela (2019) -- References 2 Critical Infrastructures -- 2.1 Examples and Definitions of Critical Infrastructures -- 2.1.1 What Makes an Infrastructure ``Critical''? -- 2.1.2 Threats -- 2.2 Cyber Security -- 2.2.1 Hacking -- 2.2.2 Malware and Ransomware -- 2.3 Physical Security of Critical Infrastructures -- 2.3.1 Eavesdropping -- 2.3.2 Jamming -- 2.3.3Intro -- Contents -- Part I Introduction -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 What are Critical Infrastructures? -- 1.2 Security Challenges for Critical Infrastructures -- 1.2.1 Natural and Physical Threats -- 1.2.1.1 Natural Disasters -- 1.2.1.2 Technical Failures -- 1.2.1.3 Disruptions and Outages -- 1.2.2 Cyber Threats -- 1.2.2.1 Distributed Denial of Service -- 1.2.2.2 Malware and Ransomware -- 1.2.2.3 Spear Phishing Attacks -- 1.2.2.4 Social Engineering -- 1.3 Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) -- 1.3.1 Characteristics -- 1.3.2 Life-Cycle -- 1.3.2.1 Step 1: Reconnaissance 1.3.2.2 Step 2: Initial Compromise -- 1.3.2.3 Step 3: Establish Foothold -- 1.3.2.4 Step 4: Escalate Privileges -- 1.3.2.5 Step 5: Internal Reconnaissance -- 1.3.2.6 Step 6: Move Laterally -- 1.3.2.7 Step 7: Maintain Presence -- 1.3.2.8 Step 8: Complete Mission -- 1.3.2.9 Step 9: Cover Tracks -- 1.4 Selected Real-Life Incidents -- 1.4.1 The Blackout in Italy (2003) -- 1.4.2 The Transportation Gridlock in Switzerland (2005) -- 1.4.3 The Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid (2015) -- 1.4.4 The WannaCry and NotPetya Malware Infections(2017) -- 1.4.5 The Blackout in Venezuela (2019) -- References 2 Critical Infrastructures -- 2.1 Examples and Definitions of Critical Infrastructures -- 2.1.1 What Makes an Infrastructure ``Critical''? -- 2.1.2 Threats -- 2.2 Cyber Security -- 2.2.1 Hacking -- 2.2.2 Malware and Ransomware -- 2.3 Physical Security of Critical Infrastructures -- 2.3.1 Eavesdropping -- 2.3.2 Jamming -- 2.3.3 Terrorist Attacks -- 2.4 Cyber-Physical Security of Critical Infrastructures -- 2.5 Simulation of Effects of Security Incidents -- 2.5.1 Network Models -- 2.5.1.1 Graph-Based Models -- 2.5.1.2 Interdependent Network Models -- 2.5.2 Stochastic Models 2.5.2.1 Markov Chain Models -- 2.5.2.2 Branching Process Models -- 2.5.2.3 High-Level Stochastic Models -- 2.5.3 Dynamic Simulation Models -- 2.5.4 Agent-Based Models -- 2.5.5 Economy Based Methods -- 2.5.5.1 Input-Output Models -- 2.5.5.2 Computable General Equilibrium Models -- 2.6 Viewing Security as a Control Problem -- References -- 3 Mathematical Decision Making -- 3.1 Preference and Ordering Relations -- 3.2 Optimization -- 3.3 Multiple Goal Optimization -- 3.4 Decision Theory -- 3.4.1 Bayesian Decisions -- 3.4.2 Minimax-Decisions -- 3.5 Game Theory -- 3.5.1 Normal Form Games 3.5.2 Zero-Sum Games -- 3.5.3 Extensive Form Games -- 3.6 Extended Concepts: Modeling Goal Interdependence -- References -- 4 Types of Games -- 4.1 Overview -- 4.2 Stackelberg Game -- 4.3 Nash Game -- 4.4 Signaling Game -- 4.5 Games Over Stochastic Orders -- References -- 5 Bounded Rationality -- 5.1 Utility Maximization and Rationality -- 5.2 The Fundamental Principles of Decision Making -- 5.3 Violations of the Invariance Axiom -- 5.4 Decision Weights -- 5.5 Rank-Dependence and Prospect Theory -- 5.6 Violations of Transitivity and Regret Theory -- 5.7 Border Effects -- 5.8 Procedural Theories … (more)
- Publisher Details:
- Cham : Springer
- Publication Date:
- 2020
- Extent:
- 1 online resource
- Subjects:
- 005.8
Computer security
Computer networks -- Security measures
Electronic books
Electronic books - Languages:
- English
- ISBNs:
- 9783030469085
3030469085 - Related ISBNs:
- 3030469077
9783030469078 - Notes:
- Note: Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Access Rights:
- Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
- Access Usage:
- Restricted: Printing from this resource is governed by The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK) and UK copyright law currently in force.
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library HMNTS - ELD.DS.513388
- Ingest File:
- 03_095.xml