Metaphysics of states of affairs : truthmaking, universals, and a farewell to Bradley's regress /: truthmaking, universals, and a farewell to Bradley's regress. (2019)

• Record Type: Book
• Further Information: Note: Bo R. Meinersten.
• Authors: Meinertsen, Bo R
• Contents: Preface; Précis; Part I-The Main Role for State of Affairs Ontology, and Its two Rivals; Part II-The Constituents of States of Affairs; Part III-The Unity of States of Affairs; Contents; 1 Introduction; 1.1 A State of Affairs Ontology; 1.2 Approach, Assumptions and Restrictions; 1.2.1 Approach; 1.2.2 Assumptions; 1.2.3 Restrictions; 1.3 The Main Problem of State of Affairs Ontology: Initial Thoughts; 1.4 The Main Role for State of Affairs Ontology, and Its Two Rivals; 1.5 Betti's Criticism of States of Affairs; References; The Main Role for State of Affairs Ontology, and Its Two Rivals 2 Truthmaking2.1 Truthmaking, Two Other Roles, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason; 2.2 Three Approaches to Truthmaking; 2.3 The Relation of Truthmaking; 2.3.1 Which Kind of Entity Are Truth-Bearers?; 2.3.2 Truthmaking; 2.4 Truthmaking at Work; 2.5 TM-Reducibility; References; 3 A Partial Look at Trope Theory; 3.1 Basic Trope Theory; 3.1.1 Selective Introduction of Tropes; 3.1.2 The Simpleness of Tropes: Is It Enigmatic or Does It Lead to Absurdity?; 3.1.3 'Free-Floating' Is Irrelevant to Relational Tropes; 3.1.4 Mertz's Argument that Nominalism Requires the Elimination of Relations 3.1.5 Trope Theory and Truthmaking: From Bundles to Substances and Attributes?3.2 The Nuclear Theory; 3.2.1 The Problem of Non-substantial Change; 3.2.2 The Nuclear Theory as a Solution to the Problem of Non-substantial Change; 3.2.3 The Nuclear Theory and Contingent Predication; References; 4 A Partial Look at Moderate Realism; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Principles of Moderate Realism; 4.2.1 Moderate Realism 'for the Sake of Argument'; 4.2.2 Exclusivity and Uniqueness of Relation Instances; 4.2.3 The Universals of Moderate Realism; 4.2.4 Ontic Predication; 4.2.5 Thick Particulars as Networks 4.3 The Simpleness of Relation InstancesReferences; The Constituents of States of Affairs; 5 Bare Particulars; 5.1 Bare Particulars and Thick Particulars; 5.2 The Bareness of Bare Particulars Is That They Instantiate Their Properties; 5.3 Interlude: Bare Particulars as Individuators; 5.4 Bare Particulars Are the Reason for the Particularity of States of Affairs; 5.5 The Generalization Argument: The Particulars in States of Affairs Are Always Bare; References; 6 Properties; 6.1 Properties and States of Affairs; 6.1.1 Terminology 6.1.2 Predicates and Armstrong's Tripartite Division of Properties6.1.3 Some TM-Reducible Kinds of Property; 6.1.4 Universals in States of Affairs; 6.2 Are There Conjunctive Universals?; 6.2.1 Introduction; 6.2.2 Mellor's Argument from Ramsey's Test; 6.2.3 Conjunctive Universals in Armstrong; References; 7 Relations; 7.1 The Three Basic Kinds of Relation; 7.1.1 Internal and External Relations; 7.1.2 Grounded Relations; 7.2 Butchvarov's Phenomenological Argument Against Relations; 7.3 Direction: Some Armstrongian Remarks; 7.3.1 Direction as a Feature of Non-symmetrical Relations
• Publisher Details: Cham : Springer
• Publication Date: 2019
• Extent: 1 online resource
• Subjects: 111; Universals (Philosophy); Attribute (Philosophy); Substance (Philosophy); Ontology; Metaphysics; PHILOSOPHY / Metaphysics; Electronic books; Electronic books
• Languages: English
• ISBNs: 9789811330681; 9811330689
• Related ISBNs: 9789811330674; 9811330670
• Notes: Note: Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed April 9, 2019).
• Access Rights: Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
• Access Usage: Restricted: Printing from this resource is governed by The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK) and UK copyright law currently in force.